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Abstract: Criminal groups often avoid the limelight, shunning publicity. However, in 
some instances they overtly communicate, such as through banners or signs. We explain 
the competition dynamics behind public criminal communication, and provide theory and 
evidence of the conditions under which it emerges. Relying on a new data set of 
approximately 1,800 banners publicly deployed by Mexican criminal groups from 2007 
to 2010, we identify the conditions behind such messaging. The findings suggest that 
criminal groups “go public” in the presence of interorganizational contestation, violence 
from authorities, antagonism toward the local media, local demand for drugs, and local 
drug production. Some of these factors are only associated with communication toward 
particular audiences – rivals, the state, or the public. Interestingly, we find that the 
correlates of criminal propaganda are sometimes distinct from those of criminal violence, 
suggesting that these phenomena are explained by separate dynamics.  
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Why do criminal groups sometimes use public communication to overtly transmit 
information to their rivals, the government, or even the general public? This kind of 
behavior is puzzling because criminal groups are often said to avoid the limelight, 
shunning publicity to avoid government attention. One key distinction the literature 
makes between criminal groups, and more “political” groups such as rebels or terrorists, 
is their level and type of public communication, particularly with the government and 
public.1 Perhaps because of the intriguing nature of criminal group public 
communication, a growing body of research seeks to understand it (Atuesta 2016, 
Campbell 2014, Décary-Hétu and Morselli 2011, Durán-Martínez 2015a, Ríos and Rivera 
2018, Ríos and Ferguson 2019).2 However, questions remain as to why it occurs at all.  
This paper builds an argument for why we sometimes see criminal groups 
publicly communicating, but more often do not. We draw on the literature on organized 
crime, and on research about other types of violent groups, such as insurgents and 
terrorists. Important distinctions exist between these groups and criminal organizations 
(e.g., Phillips 2015, Campbell and Hansen 2013), but work on the value of information in 
insurgency and the signaling nature of terrorism help explain criminal communication. 
We argue that in competitive conditions, the value of public communication is especially 
high, and therefore such information-sharing by criminal groups should be likely. Public 
criminal communication should be likely when there is: antagonism among criminal 
groups, government crackdowns, what we call “information competition” with the news 
media, local drug consumption, and local drug production. Furthermore, we argue that 
some of these factors should be especially associated with communication toward 
particular audiences: other criminals, the state, or the public. 
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Empirically, we analyze a prominent recent type of criminal communication, the 
deployment of “narco-messages” 3 during the early years of the militarized drug-related 
conflict in Mexico. The violence has led to more than 100,000 deaths, and tens of 
thousands of citizens have gone missing. Researchers seek to understand the levels of 
violence in Mexico (Osorio 2015; Calderón et al 2015; Ríos 2013, 2014, 2015; Trejo and 
Ley 2018), but far less work analyzes dynamics within the conflict such as 
communication strategies. Criminal messages in Mexico are fascinating in their own 
right, and are an example of a phenomenon that has occurred around the world, in places 
such as Colombia, Southern Italy, and U.S. cities (Coleman 1990, Carbray 2002, Ortiz 
2013). Research on such communication is important for understanding criminal violence 
and its consequences.  
To create the dependent variable of this study, we generated a data set of about 
1,800 narco-messages found in Mexico during 2007-2010.4 These publicly deployed 
banners allow criminal groups to take credit for their criminal actions, intimidate other 
potential victims, communicate with public, or threaten police or journalists. This dataset 
of narco-messages is likely to be useful to scholars of criminal violence, as well as those 
seeking to understand differences and overlaps between criminal and more political 
violence. We also introduce new data on drug consumption in Mexican municipalities, 
based on drug-related medical emergencies. 
 The next section discusses research on information and public communication by 
violent groups. We then present our argument, with relevant hypotheses. The third 
section presents original data and describes empirical tests and results. In general, we find 
that competitive environments are far more likely to produce public criminal 
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communication. Examining the intended audiences of narco-messages provides 
additional nuanced evidence. Messages targeting authorities were more likely after 
government attacks on criminal groups, for example, and messages targeting the public 
were more likely after criminal attacks on journalists. We conclude by discussing how the 
paper contributes to the literature, and consider possible steps for future research. 
 
Information, public communication, and organized crime messages 
 Information plays an important role in the study of subnational violence, such as 
civil conflict. Kalyvas’s (2006) explanation of civil war hinges on actors seeking 
information, and argues that selective violence in particular depends on private 
information. It is also crucial for participants in violent situations to share information. 
For insurgents, communication can be crucial to get the public on their side, threaten the 
government, to share information with other insurgents, and lobby foreign capitals 
(Coggins 2015, Huang 2016). Information provision is also a major part of terrorism, 
which has been described as violent propaganda or violent communication (Schmid and 
de Graaf 1982). Terrorist groups sometimes claim their attacks, for reasons including 
intergroup competition (Hoffman 2010) and communication within the group (Brown 
2017). There are also reasons militant groups do not claim attacks, for example to avoid a 
bad reputation (Kearns et al. 2014, Abrahms and Conrad 2017).  
As with insurgent or terrorist violence, in organized crime information provision 
is also critical. All sides of the “conflict” have information they want to share. 
Governments threaten groups, try to entice group members to collaborate, and try to 
encourage to witnesses to testify. Civilians caught in the middle sometimes try to publicly 
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relay information as well, for example holding protests against organized crime (Cowell 
1992; Ferrarin 2011). Beyond governments and the public transmitting message about 
organized crime, criminals of course are often purveyors of information as well.  
 
Criminal groups and public communication 
We use the term “criminal group” for any collective of individuals dedicated to 
illicit activity. This is a broad understanding (cf. Varese 2010), but consistent with other 
authors and institutions (e.g., Finckenauer 2005; United Nations 2004). This term 
includes groups from street gangs (which tend to be geographically limited) to mafias 
(which provide protection) to large trafficking organizations frequently called “cartels.” 
In Mexico, much of the discussion of violence focuses on the latter type of criminal 
group, the cartels, since they tend to be the most visible (Ríos and Rivera 2018, Ríos and 
Ferguson 2019). However, smaller groups are increasingly common as the government 
breaks up the largest cartels (Atuesta and Pérez-Dávila 2018). Additionally, all three 
types of criminal groups mentioned above have used narco-messages.5  
Criminal groups communicate with three primary audiences: the government, 
other criminal groups, and the public. A great deal of criminal group communication is 
private, as criminals seek to share information while avoiding scrutiny from authorities 
(Gambetta 2009). However, our focus here is on public communication. This includes 
billboards, graffiti, banners, speeches to a non-private audience, statements to the news 
media, tweets, and videos on Youtube (Atuesta 2016, Campbell 2014, Guevara 2013, 
Décary-Hétu and Morselli 2011, Martin 2012, Womer and Bunker 2010). Public 
communication presents a key challenge for criminal groups. Given their clandestine 
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nature, and illegal nature of their work by definition, the distributors of the information 
need some degree of anonymity. Even if they use the group’s name in the message, they 
want a way to distribute it without being traced back to specific individuals who could be 
targeted by authorities. For this reason, public communication by criminal groups is quite 
different from public communication by licit groups such as political parties or firms.  
To publicly communicate while maintaining a degree of secrecy, criminal groups 
have several options. One is graffiti, which can be done relatively quickly, reducing the 
chance of detection by authorities, and it is visible to the local community. Criminal 
groups also use more traditional communication methods. Colombia’s Medellín Cartel 
issued press releases, such as the one in 1990 pledging not to kill U.S. President George 
H. W. Bush when he visited (Coleman 1990). More recently, groups use social media 
(Womer and Bunker 2010, Décary-Hétu and Morselli 2011).  
Criminals have also used banners or signs to communicate publicly. In 2002, a 
banner at a Sicily football game sent a warning to the national government regarding a 
new law to impose stronger punishments against mafia members (Carbray 2002). In 2013 
in McAllen, Texas, a cardboard sign warned the residents to pay their debt to the Zetas 
(Ortiz 2013). The more infamous case of banner use, of course, has been Mexico since 
the 2006 militarized crackdown on drug-trafficking organizations (e.g, Maihold 2012, 
Durán-Martínez 2017).  
Banners had already been widely used in Mexico by licit actors, such as local 
governments and shops. Given their widespread use – probably because of relatively low 
cost and convenience of use – it makes sense that criminal groups would use them as 
well. When left next to dismembered bodies hung off at overpasses, or when posted in 
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areas of public gathering, criminal groups create a general feeling of fear among society 
or their enemies. Atuesta (2016) offers a descriptive account of this type of messaging by 
criminal groups and argues that the form offers an important way to understand the 
development and evolution of the violence in Mexico and its meaning. Mendoza (2016) 
suggests that the banners blur the line between the criminal and the political. Martin 
(2012) identifies types of banners, from threats to public outreach. However, it is still 
unclear why these banners appeared in some parts of Mexico but not others. 
 
The role of competition in explaining public communication by organized crime 
 This section argues competition is crucial for explaining public communication by 
criminal groups. We consider competition with other criminal groups, and with the state. 
We also discuss contestation involving the public. More specifically, the argument 
includes “information competition” with the news media, as well as messaging related to 
local drug consumption and local drug production. The underlying logic of competition 
applies to any type of public criminal communication. However, we specify how these 
factors should be associated with messages to specific audiences. We focus on three 
audiences: other criminals, authorities, and the general public. 
 Direct interorganizational competition is likely to play a role in communication by 
criminal groups. These groups vie for market space and could use public messages to 
identify their territory and warn other criminal competitors about their power (Martin 
2012). Multiple criminal groups present in an area has been shown to be important for 
explaining violence (Durán-Martínez 2015a, Osorio 2015, Ríos 2013), and as these 
groups attack each other, so it is likely to affect other outcomes such as public 
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communication as well. Indeed, Durán-Martínez (2015a) finds that intergroup 
competition is associated with more visible types of criminal violence. Research on 
terrorism is also suggestive of this notion, as it shows that groups are more likely to claim 
their attacks when there are multiple terrorist groups present in the same area (Hoffman 
2010, Abrahms and Conrad 2017).  
In the context of intergroup competition, criminal organizations face incentives to 
get the public and authorities on their side. The public can provide valuable information 
to a criminal organization, and messages directed to the police could attribute guilt for 
certain criminal actions to other criminal organizations. Information collected from the 
public can help law enforcement (e.g., Waldoff and Weiss 2010), and enforcement 
operations conducted against certain criminal groups could weaken them with respect to 
their enemies (Carpenter 2010, Trejo and Ley 2018). As criminal organizations compete 
for public loyalty, it makes sense that they would threaten the public or the police 
(Atuesta 2016), or try to convince them that other groups or the state are the enemy 
(Castillo and Cruz 2014, Martin 2012). Intergroup competition should lead to public 
messaging, whether the messages are targeted at rival groups, authorities, or the public.  
H1: Interorganizational competition leads to a higher likelihood of criminal group public 
communication. 
 Competition with the government is also likely to lead to public communication. 
Criminal groups are engaged in long-term contestation with the state, as both sides try to 
out-smart the other (Kenney 2007). State enforcement can upset preexisting equilibria, 
and often leads to more criminal violence (Dell 2015, Lessing 2017, Osorio 2015, Ríos 
2013; Ríos 2015). It is likely that enforcement operations affect public communication as 
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well.6 Emerging criminal organizations can use public communication to change the size, 
nature or objective of enforcement operations (Campbell 2012, Durán-Martínez 2015a, 
Atuesta 2017). Narco-messages are used to intimidate authorities, to report that another 
organization is doing something they consider immoral or illegal (Barboza 2008), to 
accuse them of receiving bribes and not delivering protection (Roque Madriz 2010), or 
complain about the effects of enforcement operations on the stability of the region 
(Belmonte Torres 2009).     
 The relationship between authorities and organized crime is different depending 
on the level of government. Enforcement activities against organized crime are often 
conducted by the military or federal authorities that are not only more professional, but 
more prone to be influenced by national-level political considerations (Sabet 2012). State 
and local polices might take more a lax approach towards enforcement. Clientelism, 
personalistic leadership, and appointments of local police chiefs based on camarilla 
loyalties, instead of technical expertise and professional experience, are common practice 
(Sabet 2012). Municipal police forces have long been an obstacle in fighting organized 
crime because of their relationships with criminal groups (Sabet 2010, Solar 2015). 
Sometimes when local police arrest members of an organized crime group, it is at the 
behest of the group’s rivals.  
Overall, the type and effectiveness of enforcement varies depending on the level 
of government, but there have been substantial enforcement operations aimed at criminal 
organizations. In the presence of such crackdowns, public communication by criminal 
groups seems like a likely response.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
  10 
H2: Government enforcement leads to a higher likelihood of criminal group public 
communication. 
 In addition to trying to communicate with other criminal groups and the state, 
criminal organizations also try to address the public more broadly. One relevant aspect of 
public communication involves efforts to control information from the mass media (Ríos 
and Ferguson 2019, Ríos and Rivera 2018). In certain locations there is fierce 
competition over the control of information (Holland and Rios 2017). The role of 
information is instrumental to the reputation building of criminal organizations and helps 
them achieve massive dissemination of their message if media coverage exists (Campbell 
2012, Durán-Martínez 2015a). When information is especially salient, criminal 
organizations want their side to be represented. 
How do we recognize information competition? Attacks on the media are an 
indicator of such competition since both media and criminal organizations seek the 
public’s attention. Throughout the world, the assassination of journalists is unfortunately 
common (Gohdes and Carey 2017, Holland and Ríos 2017), and perpetrators include 
states, insurgents, and criminal groups. In these situations, information provision to the 
public is disputed. When this happens, it is likely also that violent actors such as criminal 
groups will be engaging in their own communication with the public. This is not 
necessarily to suggest that one phenomenon causes the other, but that both stem from 
competition over information.  
In the context of the Mexican drug war, information competition has manifested 
itself in a number of ways. Criminal groups have attacked journalists to get them to 
reduce or their coverage of crime, and to strategically get the journalists to publish more 
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favorable coverage.7 Some narco-messages contain direct threats to journalists, alluding 
to their formal or informal allegiances to rival criminal groups (El Siglo de Durango 
2010).8 Even when messages are not directed at journalists, the notion of information 
competition suggests criminal groups are trying to shape public discussions about them. 
For instance, trying to convince the public that other groups or the state are the enemy 
(Castillo and Cruz 2014, Martin 2012).  
It is important to mention that self-censorship, political intimidation, attacks by 
local private powers, and other practices have created an environment of media 
restrictions in Mexico before contemporary criminal elements emerged. Journalists have 
been assassinated, almost always without sanction, since at least the late XIX century, 
with both public and private interests behind these crimes (Moncada 2012). Other forms 
of non-violent coercion and co-optation had also long played a role in limiting free press 
and the democratic spread of information (Lawson 2002). Poor salaries and contracts, for 
example, hamper efficient reporting and proper research journalism (Rodriguez Luna 
2017). Given this history, it seems that criminal groups might be adapting to it in their 
own way, sometimes choosing to produce their own publicity in a crowded and especially 
dangerous information environment. In other words, when information is more salient, 
criminal groups should use do-it-your-self publishing.    
H3: Information competition leads to a higher likelihood of criminal group public 
communication. 
 We also consider two ways local markets might be valuable and, as a result, 
encourage criminal groups to publicly communicate: local consumption, and local drug 
production. While criminal organizations do not always deal exclusively in drugs – they 
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can engage in any illegal product or service provision – the drug market is the most 
profitable, and probably most commonly discussed, lucrative activity for criminal 
organizations (UNODC 2011). Regarding the local market, when a local community 
includes a substantial number of illegal drug consumers, this suggests a particular kind of 
relationship between organized crime and the public.  
In Mexico, since the early 2000s, instead of simply transporting products through 
the area, criminal organizations seem to increasingly depend on the locals as customers – 
and as a result are especially likely to share information with them. Communications 
could include threats to authorities or other criminal groups, and warnings about law 
enforcement (Martin 2012). Given the valuable local market, groups also face heightened 
incentives to threaten competing organizations and the government.9 However, 
independently of interorganizational competition, the relationship between traffickers and 
the general public is likely to result in a greater likelihood of public communication. 
Groups might want to advertise to potential consumers, warn potential customers to not 
buy from the competition, and recruit lower-level dealers. Overall, this suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: Local market competition leads to a higher likelihood of criminal group public 
communication. 
 
Beyond a local market regarding consumption, certain areas are better than others 
for production.  A territory with homegrown drugs, such as marijuana and opium 
poppies, is of special value to criminal organizations (Dube et al 2016). Mexico has 
always been a leading supplier of marijuana, but started to gain importance due to its 
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supply of heroin in recent decades (USDS 2011). This changed the dynamics of criminal 
group operations. Criminals were not only interested in controlling drug trafficking 
routes, but also in controlling rural areas engaged in drug crop cultivation (Escalante 
2009).  Given the value of these territories, groups face heightened incentives to threaten 
competing organizations through public communication. They are also likely to threaten 
authorities who might interfere with production. Perhaps more importantly, the criminal 
organizations communicate with land owners and farm workers. Regardless of the 
specific audience, local drug production represents an area of great interest to criminal 
organizations, and one that should inspire public communication by these groups.   
H5: Local drug production leads to a higher likelihood of criminal group public 
communication. 
 
Aiming at specific audiences: Other criminals, the state, and the public 
 While the hypotheses above are about the likelihood of public communication in 
general, here we briefly specify that certain types of behavior should be associated with 
communication aimed at particular audiences. We focus on the three possible audiences 
mentioned previously: other criminals, the state, and the public. This should help to 
clarify causal mechanisms, and potentially add some validity to the primary results. First, 
while there are reasons to expect that intergroup competition should lead to 
communication with all three audiences, it seems likely that groups confronting each 
other should also publicly communicate with each other.        
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H6: Criminal group competition leads to a higher likelihood of criminal group public 
communication especially when the intended audience is other criminal groups, as 
opposed to other audiences. 
 
Second, state enforcement might spur criminals to communicate to other 
audiences, but it seems especially likely to encourage criminals to send messages to the 
state. Criminal groups demand that the state back off, blame their peers, and threaten 
politicians. This type of response seems realistic.       
H7: Government enforcement leads to a higher likelihood of criminal group public 
communication where the intended audience is the state, as opposed to other audiences. 
 
Finally, attacks on the media, a local drug market, and local drug production 
should all be associated with communication aimed at the public. Attacks on the media 
indicate an interest in control over information distributed to the public. In these 
situations, criminal groups are trying to reach out to the public, so it would make sense 
that they would also directly address the public in their own communications. Regarding 
local drug consumption, the presence of such consumption suggests many members of 
the public are potential consumers. When there is local production, many farmers are 
suppliers in the production chain, and their neighbors are probably aware of this. In this 
context, criminal groups might be especially likely to reach out to the public directly as 
issues arise, such as maintaining the loyalty of local farmers or community more broadly.   
  15 
H8: Attacks on the media, local drug consumption, and local drug production lead to a 
higher likelihood of criminal group public communication where intended audience is the 
general public, as opposed to other audiences. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 Table 1 summarizes the argument, indicating the important concepts behind the 
hypotheses primary hypotheses (H1-5), and the actors who are the intended audiences of 
narco-messages (H6-8).  
 
Illustrative case example 
The hypotheses are primarily evaluated using the quantitative tests in the next 
section. First, however, we briefly discuss an illustrative case that demonstrates the 
plausibility of the theorized explanation. We discuss examples from the municipality of 
Chilpancingo, Guerrero, which is located between Mexico City and Acapulco.  
Multiple criminal groups have battled for control over Chilpancingo, and this has 
manifested itself in narco-messages, consistent with H1. In 2009, body parts of five men 
appeared in the city center, with a poster purportedly from Arturo Beltran Leyva, a 
powerful criminal leader. The sign mockingly called rival groups to send “more qualified 
people,” implying that they tried to attack his group but failed (Ramos 2009). The Beltran 
Leyva group had been fighting the Sinaloa Cartel and La Familia Michoacana in the area. 
The communication to rival groups suggests support for H6.  
When Mexican Marines killed Beltran Leyva several months later in a 
neighboring state, a narco-message at a nearby kindergarten warned authorities of a 
counterattack (El Universal 2009b). This response to enforcement is consistent with H2, 
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and the government audience is consistent with H7. Criminal groups also deployed 
narco-messages in Chilpancingo to respond to authorities. For example, as security forces 
swept the area, narco-mantas addressed President Calderón, asking him to “respect 
families” and not involve innocent relatives of criminal group members (Reforma 2009). 
Competition over information is apparently an issue in Chilpancingo. In 2010, a 
local crime reporter was found dead in a ditch with five bullet wounds in his body (El 
Universal 2010).10  As noted previously, criminal groups often attack journalists for 
reporting news in a way that is divergent from what the criminals want. A desire to shape 
public perceptions is also likely to help explain the regular occurrence of narco-messages, 
as H3 suggests. Related to this, criminal organizations have close relationships with a 
substantial number of inhabitants of Chilpancingo due to local drug consumption and 
production (e.g., BBC 2013, Galarce Sosa 2012). Ties to the public contribute to the idea 
of information competition, as groups in Chilpancingo seem to use narco-messages to 
convince the community that they are on their side. This would be consistent with H4, 
H5, and H8. 
For example, in 2009 a sign – purportedly signed by Beltran Leyva –
accompanying bags of human body parts criticized the dead as kidnappers and informed 
the public to not be alarmed by the deaths (El Universal 2009a). In 2016, a similar 
message told the pubic that they were not targets, informing them not to be worried by 
violence (El Sur 2016). In 2018, a narco-message from Cartel del Sur announced, 
“Citizens of Chilpancingo know that we don’t kidnap or extort” (Uno Más Uno 2018). 
Appealing to the public seems more likely when criminal groups depend on the local 
population and therefore feel a need to keep it on their side. The coexistence of journalist 
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targeting, drug consumption, drug production, and narco-messages to the general public 
in Chilpancingo suggests the logic outlined for H8. 
This brief snapshot provides some evidence supporting the theorized 
relationships, at least in this municipality. We have found similar patterns in other 
municipalities, such as Ecatepec, Estado de México; Zitácuaro, Michoacán; and Tecate, 
Baja California. The next section seeks to understand if there are relationships between 
hypothesized factors and narco-messages throughout the country.  
 
Data and analysis 
 Our quantitative analyses use an original database of about 1,800 narco-messages 
found in Mexico during 2007-2010. In general, narco-messages are texts left by criminal 
organizations in a public place to communicate with other criminal groups, the public, or 
authorities. Some examples of reasons why these signs appear include to clarify why they 
assassinated someone, to intimidate other potential victims, or to identify themselves or 
their victims. The text can be professionally printed on vinyl banners, hand-written on 
cardboard signs, or scrawled on bedsheets. Narco-messages are a disturbing innovation 
that stretches the boundaries of traditional graffiti and that, mimicking the campaign 
language of Mexican political parties with a tone that can be oddly formal (Salopek 
2011), function to communicate with citizens around the area, or give instructions to the 
police, journalists or local public officials. The most common topics of narco-messages 
are displays of territorial control, encouragement to cooperate with the sender, corruption 
accusations, attempts to enforce internal drug codes, or to explain their activities (Martin 
2012).11  
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Our data set is unique because it not only contains information of the municipality 
and date of each of the 1,800 narco-messages, but also records the complete message and 
the intended recipient of the message when available. To gather this information, we 
performed massive amounts of queries at online search engines using Spanish 
translations of narco-message(s) as our keywords. In the same way that Coscia and Rios 
(2012) searched for criminal activity, we relied on Google as our main search engine, but 
we also gathered a team of researchers to read, filter and classify all the results. We used 
information from local newspapers, amateur blogs and forums (e.g. “El Blog del Narco”). 
One complication we faced was to make sure that each narco-banner was independent, 
and not just a replica covered by different media sources. When a message contained the 
same text, was displayed in the same municipality, and around the same date, we 
assumed it could be duplicated coverage.  
To test hypotheses 6-8, we disaggregate the dependent variable depending on 
whether the banners targeted other criminal groups, the government, or the public. 
Unfortunately, for many banners it was unclear who the intended audience was. The rest 
were coded as directed to a group, government, or public. A single message can be 
classified in more than one category. The most common category is criminal group with 
983 cases. The same number of messages are coded for public or government audiences – 
258 each.  
The unit of analysis of the study is municipality-year, and models examine the 
nearly 2,500 Mexican municipalities in four years: 2007-2010. These have been some of 
the most violent years of the so-called “drug war.” Additionally, and importantly from a 
research design perspective, many media outlets stopped reporting about narco-messages 
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in 2011 at the government’s encouragement (Martínez 2011). As a result, counts of 
narco-messages starting in 2011 could under-count the number of messages, and a time-
series study with data before and after 2011 is potentially problematic. The dependent 
variable is Narco-message, a dichotomous variable coded “1” if a narco-message was 
reported in the municipality that year. We use a dichotomous variable, instead of a count, 
because we are interested in the presence or absence of narco-messages more than a 
change in their number. Additionally, the vast majority of observations never have a 
narco-message. The important variation seems to be between 0 and 1. (Results are similar 
if a count model is used.) Map 1 shows narco-messages appeared throughout Mexico.    
[Map 1 about here.] 
 To measure interorganizational competition, for the first hypothesis, we use 
Criminal organizations, a count of the number of criminal groups reported to be 
operating in the municipality in the year. For this variable, we use the Cosia and Rios 
(2012) data, which employs a text-analysis algorithm to extract web content about 
recorded criminal activities (Coscia and Rios 2012). This data set has been widely used 
(Osorio 2015, Gonzalez 2015, Dube et al 2016). For the hypothesis about government 
enforcement, we use data from Osorio (2015) on violent confrontations by authorities to 
create the variable Government enforcement. The municipality-year is coded “1” if 
authorities attacked, killed, or wounded presumed members of organized crime. For the 
third hypothesis, about information competition and attacks on the media, we include 
Journalist killed, a variable coded “1” if a journalist had been killed in the municipality 
that year. We use data collected by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). There are 
alternative sources, however, we work with CPJ data because it uses a strict coding 
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mechanism.12 Moreover, it is the largest available time series. The data include 27 cases 
of journalists assassinated in 13 states. We identified the exact municipality by examining 
the details of the cases covered by the media. 
 Drug consumption, to test the fourth hypothesis, is a dichotomous measure coded 
“1” in municipality-years where at least one person has been hospitalized for a reason 
related to illegal drugs (SSA 2008-2011). A similar exercise was done by [Author Year] 
using data of mortality certificates and hospitalization records. Our new data is 
innovative because it is not limited to patients that occupied a bed in the hospitalization 
area, but all cases of medical emergencies, that is, all those cases when an individual 
entered an emergency room. We collected and systematized data from medical 
emergencies datasets to identify the extent to which drugs are commonly consumed by 
counting cases of urgent medical attention caused by the consumption of illegal drugs.13 
This required us to perform the substantial task of reviewing millions of medical and 
legal records for every case of drug-consumption-related medical urgency recorded from 
2007 to 2010.  
The sources contain the registry of the codes of medical issues presented by the 
individuals according to the international classification of diseases. The location 
associated with the hospitalization is the municipality where the medical event happened, 
not where it was registered. This location is reported by the patient herself, or in case of 
death, it is the place of residence of the victim. Drug consumption rates in Mexico are 
quite low. Consistent with this, very few municipalities have medical emergencies for 
drug-related reasons. For the fifth hypothesis, we use Drug production, a 0-3 ordinal 
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variable from Osorio (2015) that indicates the degree of presence of local drug 
cultivation.  
 Models include a number of control variables to take into consideration alternate 
explanations for the appearance of narco-messages. Models include the three categories 
of “drug-related homicides” according to the Mexican government: confrontations, 
executions and aggressions (SNSP 2007-2011). Among drug-related homicides, 
“confrontations” are homicides caused by confrontations between two rival criminal 
organizations. “Aggressions” are criminal group attacks against authorities. “Executions” 
are those in which the victim was visibly targeted, rather than killed as part of a shoot-
out. Variables use rates per 100,000 inhabitants. These measures are not highly 
correlated. In general, there do not seem to be multicollinearity issues in models, as 
indicated by pairwise correlation tests and variance inflation factors. 
 Regarding political dynamics, we include a dummy variable called PAN 
municipal government coded “1” for municipalities ruled by the National Action Party. 
These municipalities had more violence than others (Dell 2015). Federal coordination is 
a dichotomous variable coded “1” if the municipality and state are ruled by the same 
political party. We expect this to be negatively related to narco-messages because 
previous work shows that coordination across levels of government can be crucial to 
maintaining the status quo regarding organized crime (Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009, 
Trejo and Ley 2018). We also include a dummy called Government turnover, coded “1” 
in the first year that a new municipal government had taken office. Some studies have 
shown that government alternation breaks relationships between the state and organized 
crime, leading to strife (Trejo and Ley 2018).  
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During the years of this study, the Mexican government launched major military 
operations to battle organized crime – but only in certain parts of the country. To take this 
into consideration, we include Military presence, which counts army deaths in each state-
year. This is an imperfect measure, but we do not have precise data on armed forces 
deployments over time. Military presence is not highly correlated (<.20) with 
Government enforcement, perhaps because multiple government actors confront 
organized crime. Data come from the Drug Policy Program (PPD) at the Center for 
Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE). 
Regarding geographic and demographic factors, we include U.S. border, coded 
“1” for municipalities in states that border the United States. Economic inequality is the 
standard Gini coefficient measure of income inequality in each municipality (CONEVAL 
2010). Some studies find inequality related to crime (Enamorado et al. 2016, Phillips 
2017), so it could also help explain messaging. Economic development is an index of 
economic vulnerability that measures basic development indicators (CONAPO 2011). 
Population is a natural logarithm of the municipality population (CONAPO 2014). 
Models include year dummy variables because narco-messages might be more common 
in some years than other, but these variables are not shown for space reasons.  
 The model is a rare events logistic regression (King and Zeng 2001) because 
around 95 percent of the observations are zeroes. However, results are robust if a regular 
logit is used. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Results are robust to                                            
other approaches, some of which are discussed below.   
 
Results 
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[Table 2 about here.] 
 In Table 2, Model 1 is the primary model, with the dependent variable of narco-
message regardless of intended audience. Criminal groups is statistically significant and 
positively signed. This suggests support for the first hypothesis. Regarding substantive 
significance (see Figure 1), odds ratios suggest that for each additional criminal group in 
a municipality, the municipality is almost 3 times as likely to have a narco-message. 
Government enforcement is statistically insignificant. This is unexpected and suggests 
government violence against criminal groups is not related to public communication by 
these groups. However, results below suggest that depends on the audience of the 
communication. Journalist killed is statistically significant and positively signed. This 
suggests support for the third hypothesis, although the statistical significance is not as 
strong as it is for some other variables. A municipality with a journalist killing is about 
twice as likely as one without one to have a narco-message. Both Drug consumption and 
Drug production are statistically significant and positively signed, as expected. Local 
drug business is related to public communication by criminal groups, suggesting support 
for hypotheses 4 and 5. The presence of drug consumption or drug production indicates a 
municipality is about 1.5 times as likely as another municipality to have a narco-message.  
[Figure 1 about here.] 
Models 2-4 use the disaggregated versions of the dependent variable, depending 
on the intended audience of the banners. Substantive effects are shown in Figure 2. In 
Model 2, the dependent variable is narco-messages aimed at criminal organizations. In 
this model, Criminal organizations has a larger coefficient than it did in Model 1, or 
indeed any of the models, lending some support to the idea that interorganizational 
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violence is especially associated with communication with other groups, Hypothesis 6. 
Model 3 uses the dependent variable of banners targeted at authorities. Only in this model 
is Government enforcement statistically significant and associated with the dependent 
variable. This supports hypothesis 7. Model 4’s dependent variable is narco-messages 
intended for the public. As expected, the coefficient on Journalist killed is highly 
statistically significant and much larger in this model, consistent with Hypothesis 7. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that a municipality where a journalist was killed is almost four 
times more likely to have a narco-message aimed at the public. However, the results for 
Drug consumption and Drug production are similar to or weaker than their results in 
Model 1, suggesting local drug business dynamics are not especially associated with 
communication targeting the general public as expected. There is mixed support for 
Hypothesis 7, but the difference in results regarding Journalist killed is remarkable.  
[Figure 2 about here.] 
Many of the control variables return expected results. Regarding violence 
measures, none of the homicide measures are consistently associated with narco-
messages. One homicide measure, Aggressions is statistically significant in two models, 
correlated with narco-messages in general and those targeting authorities. This makes 
sense because the “aggressions” category are those involving attacks against authorities.  
 Regarding political variables, PAN municipality is only statistically significant in 
the first model, and negatively signed. This is surprising because other work finds areas 
ruled by the PAN party were especially violent (Dell 2015). This is suggestive that 
violence and the narco-messages are two distinct phenomena. Contrasting with this, in 
most models there is a statistically significant and negative sign on the coefficients for 
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Federal coordination, as expected. However, Government turnover is also statistically 
significant and negatively signed in two models, while alternation is usually associated 
with increased violence. Military presence is statistically significant and positively 
signed in all models, suggesting areas with military deployments and fatalities are more 
likely to see narco-messages. Together these results suggest that some of the 
determinants of violence are also associated with narco-messages, while others are not. 
The coefficient on US border is statistically significant but negatively signed in all 
models. This suggests that municipalities in states near the U.S. border are less likely 
than other municipalities to have a narco-message. This is surprising, but it could be 
because many areas bordering the US are not official ports of entry, and therefore less 
disputed by criminal groups. While narco-messages occurred throughout the country, for 
various reasons there might have been a greater concentration of them far from the U.S. 
border, in the southern part of the country. Alternately, perhaps the stakes at the border 
are so high that groups simply engage directly in violence instead of communicating 
threats or other messages. Economic inequality is statistically significant and positively 
signed in most models, as expected. Economic development is always negatively signed 
and statistically significant, as expected. The coefficient on Population is statistically 
significant and positively signed in most models, suggesting more populous 
municipalities are more likely to have public criminal communication.  
 These results, particularly of Model 1, are robust to many changes not shown here 
for space reasons.14 Most results are consistent with the following changes: no control 
variables, only violent municipalities, municipality random effects instead of clustered 
standard errors, or a traditional logit instead of rare events logit. If count models (e.g., 
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zero-inflated negative binomials) are used with a count of narco-messages, results are 
robust. In other words, the factors associated with an increased likelihood of narco-
messages are also associated with additional narco-messages in the same area. 
 
Conclusion 
 Why do criminal organizations sometimes publicly communicate with the 
government, their rivals, and the public? Criminal groups around the world exhibit this 
behavior, which in some ways is like tactics of insurgent or terrorist organizations 
(Phillips 2018). However, the precise motivations behind public criminal communication 
have been unclear. This paper outlined a theory of competition and tested it on an 
important case, Mexico in the early years of its “drug war.” Consistent with the theory, 
results suggested that narco-messages were especially likely to appear in municipalities 
with multiple criminal groups, where the state had violently confronted groups, where 
competition over information had led to the murder of journalists, and where there was 
local drug consumption or production. Other factors robustly associated with narco-
messages were military deployments, economic inequality and poverty. Interestingly, 
some variables often related to violence, such as PAN municipal governance, show no 
consistent relationship with narco-messages. We found government turnover, associated 
with criminal violence in other studies, negatively related to the messages. 
 These findings are important for several reasons. First, they shed light on the 
public and informational aspects of organized crime. While criminal groups’ motives are 
ultimately financial, they nonetheless behave in some ways like political actors, reaching 
out to governments and regular citizens (Campbell and Hansen 2013), and the violence 
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has many political implications (e.g., Ley 2017). The relationship between the killing of 
journalists and the appearance of narco-messages suggests public information provision 
can be a crucial element of organized crime. Second, some findings suggest that 
explanations of organized crime violence are distinct from explanations of organized 
crime public communication. Additionally, only certain violence measures were related 
to narco-messages. Criminal communication does not only appear where criminal 
violence occurs, but in a broad range of places and for distinct reasons.  
The findings suggest additional steps for future research. Are the determinants of 
public communication by criminal organizations similar in other cases, such as graffiti or 
social media? Regarding more fine-grained analysis of the narco-messages, what does 
their content tell us about the nature of violence in Mexico? Some descriptive analysis of 
the texts of narco-messages reports interesting findings (Martin 2012, Atuesta 2016), but 
more work remains to be done. What can we learn from patterns in the contents of narco-
messages? And are the patterns we find in this study consistent in more recent years? 
Finally, some work could be done to try to understand downstream effects after criminal 
public communication appears. Does criminal communication affect subsequent crime, or 
in other ways warn us about likely future behavior?           
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Map and figures 
Map 1. The geographic distribution of narco-messages in Mexico, 2007-2010 
 
Source: Authors’ data 
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Figure 1. Substantive effects from Model 1: How factors relate to narco-messages  
 
95% confidence intervals shown. 
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Figure 2. Substantive effects from Models 2-4, with different narco-message audiences 
 
95% confidence intervals shown. 
 
 
  
  40 
Tables 
Table 1. Narco-messages, related factors, and intended audiences 
Primary 
hypotheses 
Key concept or variable Intended audience  
H1 Inter-group competition Other groups (H6) 
H2 Government enforcement Authorities (H7)  
H3 Information competition Public (H8) 
H4 Drug consumption Public (H8) 
H5 Drug production Public (H8) 
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Table 2. Rare events logistic regressions of narco-messages in Mexican municipalities 
 Model 1 
Main model 
All narco-
messages 
Model 2 
Audience:  
Other 
criminal 
groups 
Model 3 
Audience: 
Government 
Model 4 
Audience: 
Public 
Criminal organizations 1.024*** 1.042*** 0.743*** 0.692*** 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.098) (0.095) 
Government enforcement 0.124 0.076 0.777*** -0.062 
 (0.141) (0.156) (0.244) (0.244) 
Journalist killed 0.676* 0.605 0.361 1.326** 
 (0.407) (0.505) (0.541) (0.516) 
Drug consumption 0.407*** 0.469*** 0.352 0.445* 
 (0.147) (0.170) (0.276) (0.255) 
Drug production 0.364*** 0.318*** 0.129 0.250* 
 (0.086) (0.095) (0.147) (0.134) 
Execution rate 0.004 0.003* 0.005** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Aggression rate 0.031** 0.001 0.017*** 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Confrontation rate 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
PAN municipality -0.632* -0.611 -1.020 -0.904 
 (0.357) (0.395) (0.711) (0.591) 
Federal coordination -0.285** -0.526*** -0.361 -0.487** 
 (0.129) (0.150) (0.227) (0.222) 
Government turnover -0.662*** -0.819*** -0.356 -0.368 
 (0.147) (0.169) (0.269) (0.242) 
Military presence 0.114*** 0.145*** 0.119*** 0.130*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.029) 
U.S. border -1.844*** -1.757*** -1.050*** -1.575*** 
 (0.268) (0.289) (0.360) (0.486) 
Economic inequality 3.581** 2.383 9.200*** 6.655** 
 (1.741) (1.915) (3.286) (2.760) 
Economic development -0.658*** -0.553*** -0.834*** -0.615*** 
 (0.095) (0.116) (0.194) (0.175) 
Population 0.144*** 0.085* 0.061 0.091** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.041) 
Constant -8.645*** -8.587*** 733,289.214 2166741*** 
 (0.870) (1.041) (0.000) (1.194) 
Observations 8,119 8,119 8,119 8,119 
Standard errors clustered by municipality shown in parentheses. *p<.10, **p<.05, 
***p<.01.   
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Notes 
Acknowledgments: We thank Karina Aguilera, Mylene Cano, and Omar Espejel for 
research assistance. 
1 Hoffman (2006, 36) argues that a crucial distinction between terrorists and criminals is 
that “the criminal is not concerned with influencing or affecting public opinion.” 
2 One exception is research on graffiti, discussed below. 
3 There is no consensus term for this phenomenon in English. In Spanish, they are often 
called narcomensajes, literally narco-messages. The “narco” phrasing is not always 
technically accurate because perpetrators might be engaged in other illicit businesses, and 
not only the drug business.   
4 Our quantitative tests analyze 2007-2010, important early years in the violence. We 
focus on these years because many news agencies stopped reporting on narco-messages 
in 2011, at the government’s encouragement, which introduces challenges for data 
collection. We discuss this more below. 
5 When we could identify the perpetrator, larger cartels were the most common 
perpetrators. However, many messages are un-signed, or falsely attributed to others.      
6 Beyond this direct effect of competition with the state, it is also possible there is a 
longer-term, indirect effect because state actions are likely to lead to more 
interorganizational competition when groups fragment (e.g., Carpenter 2010).  
7 Criminal groups are frequently covered by the media (Chermak and Chapman 2007). 
These groups’ actions might especially induce coverage if crimes are provocative. The 
news media can unwittingly help them intimidate their enemies (Durán Martínez 2015a). 
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8 Organized crime may not relate in the same way to different types of media. Most 
information competition seems to happen at the local level, where journalists are least 
protected and where more detailed accounts of local crime are regularly reported. 
9 A local market on its own does not necessarily lead to violence. Durán-Martínez 
(2015b) shows that the level of violence depends on the relationship between local gangs 
and larger drug-trafficking organizations. 
10 This reporter was not left with a narco-message, or any other way to infer the precise 
reason for his death. However, the fact that he was a crime reporter is suggestive. Other 
killings have been more directly related to narco-messages, such as a narco-message in 
Acapulco that named the partner of a recently-murdered blogger, and accused another 
news outlet of cooperating with (presumably rival) criminals (Flores Contreras 2018).  
11 Narco-messages frequently appear in incidents involving violence, often as part of a 
more grisly and symbolic form of communication left at a crime scene. In our dataset, 
about 70% of the banners are paired to a homicide.  
12 Another approach would be to gather information on threats or injuries to journalists. 
This would likely result in under-reporting, as many such incidents are not reported. 
13 We consider this better than using counts of detainees for illicit drug use because our 
measure does not depend on the willingness/capacity of authorities to enforce the law.  
14 Results are available from the authors. 
